

19 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: OTR Unit Chiefs  
SUBJECT : White House Handouts

1. Herewith are four documents from the White House. They include:

- a. An Executive Order
- b. A Fact Sheet
- c. Draft Legislation
- d. Statement to the Congress

Each Unit Chief is to review these documents thoroughly, especially Section 5 of the Executive Order, and to advise me by close of business, 23 February 1976, in writing, of any problems in carrying out your respective programs which may arise from these. Describe the impact of the problems and how they may be resolved or what you would like to see done about them.

2. If there are no problems, a negative reply is expected. The DD/A specifically requested that we ascertain precisely what OTS is doing [REDACTED]. It follows that we have to know if any OTS activity contravenes these instructions.

STATINTL

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[REDACTED]  
Alfonso Rodriguez  
Director of Training

Att

ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ

CHIEF OF STAFF



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CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

White House Handouts

FROM:

Director of Training  
1026, C of C Bldg.

EXTENSION

NO.

25X1A

DATE

19 February 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

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*Org. & Mgt. (Policy Papers)*

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FORM  
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USE PREVIOUS  
EDITIONS

SECRET



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EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL 12 P.M. (EST)  
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976

February 18, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

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Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to establish policies to improve the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence agencies and departments of the national government.

Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this Order, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms shall have these meanings:

(a) Intelligence means:

(1) Foreign intelligence which means information, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or their agents; and

(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means activities conducted to protect the United States and United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination or terrorism.

(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following organizations:

- (1) Central Intelligence Agency;
- (2) National Security Agency;
- (3) Defense Intelligence Agency;

- (4) Special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
- (5) Intelligence elements of the military services;
- (6) Intelligence element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- (7) Intelligence element of the Department of State;
- (8) Intelligence element of the Department of the Treasury; and
- (9) Intelligence element of the Energy Resources and Development Administration.

(c) Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means activities, other than the collection and production/of intelligence and related support functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.

(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence Program and other programs of the departments and agencies, not including tactical intelligence, designated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the Program.

Sec. 3. Control and Direction of National Intelligence Organizations.

(a) National Security Council.

(1) The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. Statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Among its responsibilities, the National Security Council shall provide guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities.

(3) The National Security Council shall conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies and of ongoing special activities in support of national Foreign policy objectives. These reviews shall consider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national Foreign policy objectives. The National Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as designated by the President as part of these reviews.

(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(1) There is established the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the CFI), which shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the DCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The CFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.

(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget, review, and amend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules governing the reprogramming of funds within this budget. Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.

(ii) Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence.

(iii) Establish policy for the management of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence; however, neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence.

(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community in order to ensure compliance with policy directions of the NSC.

(3) The CFI shall be supported by the Intelligence Community staff headed by the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community.

(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees as it deems appropriate to ensure consultation with members of the Intelligence Community on policies and guidance issued by the CFI.

(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the National Security Council upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the National Security Council.

(c) The Operations Advisory Group.

(1) There is established the Operations Advisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the Operations Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the President. The Attorney General and the Director



of the Office of Management and Budget or their representatives, and others who may be designated by the President, shall attend all meetings as observers.

(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider and develop a policy recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to his decision on each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the Operations Group.

(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelligence collection operations as designated by the Operations Group.

(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive intelligence collection operations.

(3) The Operations Group shall discharge the responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c) (2) (i) and (c) (2) (iii) of this section only after consideration in a formal meeting attended by all members and observers; or, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer is unavailable, when a designated representative of the member or observer attends.

(4) The staff of the National Security Council shall provide support to the Operations Group.

(d) Director of Central Intelligence.

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,

pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall be responsible directly to the National Security Council and the President. He shall:

(i) Chair the CFI.

(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community staff.

(iii) Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI.

(iv) Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.

(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety of requests, and responses thereto, from the White House Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to the Intelligence Community.

(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility within the United States shall be limited to:

(A) Protection by lawful means against disclosure by present or former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees of persons or organizations, presently or formerly under contract with the Agency;

(B) providing leadership, guidance and technical assistance to other government departments and agencies performing foreign intelligence activities; and

(C) in cases involving serious or continuing security violations, recommending to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further investigation.

(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information as appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.

(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector General capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence Community and that each Inspector General submits quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report which sets forth any questionable activities in which that intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.

(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Community, of common security standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products, and for granting access thereto.

(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign intelligence products by Congress.

(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and a national level current intelligence publication.

(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priorities for the transmission of critical intelligence, and provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.

(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors, producers and users of intelligence to assist in his conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.

(xv) Establish such users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Resources and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence.

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(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community is hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).

(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent with his statutory responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403(a)).

(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of his responsibilities, the heads of all departments and agencies shall give him access to all information relevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United States. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall be provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps to maintain its confidentiality.

Sec. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation prescribed by this section of the Order relate to the activities of our foreign intelligence agencies. In some instances, detailed implementation of this Executive order will be contained in classified documents because of the sensitivity of the information and its relation

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to national security. All such classified instructions will be consistent with this Order. Unless otherwise specified within this section, its provisions apply to activities both inside and outside the United States, and all references to law are to applicable laws of the United States. Nothing in this section of this Order shall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.

The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall ensure that, in discharging the duties and responsibilities enumerated for their organizations which relate to foreign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council and other elements of the Government. In carrying out their duties and responsibilities, senior officials shall ensure that all policies and directives relating to intelligence activities are carried out in accordance with law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:

(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities of the other elements of the Intelligence Community in order to achieve maximum efficiency.

(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) Establish internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and ensuring that such are made known to, and acknowledged by, each employee.

(4) Provide for a strong and independent organization for identification and inspection of, and reporting on, unauthorized activity.

(5) Report to the Attorney General that information which relates to detection or prevention of possible violations of law by any person, including an employee of the senior official's department or agency.

(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelligence, the CFI, the Operations Group, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board all of the information required for the performance of their respective duties.

(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the provision of services of common concern as directed by the Director of Central Intelligence and provide other departments and agencies with such mutual assistance as may be within his capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the Intelligence Community for reasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational necessity.

(8) sources and methods consistent with the policies of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(9) Review all classified material and promptly declassify it consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.

(10) Provide administrative and support functions required by his department or agency.

(b) The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be related to the foreign intelligence functions outlined below. As authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

(1) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological, and geographic intelligence, to meet the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the United States Government.

(2) Develop and conduct programs to collect political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological information, not otherwise



obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in accordance with directives of the National Security Council.

(3) Collect and produce intelligence on foreign aspects of international terrorist activities and traffic in narcotics.

(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence activities outside the United States and when in the United States in coordination with the FBI subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

(5) Carry out such other special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as may be directed by the President or the National Security Council and which are within the limits of applicable law.

(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community, services of common concern as directed by the National Security Council, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and television broadcasts and foreign press services, collection of foreign intelligence information from cooperating sources in the United States, acquisition and translation of foreign publications and photographic interpretation.

(7) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized in this subsection.

(8) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information and personnel. In order to maintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investigations of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary.

(9) Conduct administrative, technical and support activities in the United States or abroad as may be necessary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (8) above, including procurement, maintenance and transport; communications and data processing; recruitment and training; the provision of personnel, financial and medical services; development of essential cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into contracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies and institutions to provide classified or unclassified research, analytical and developmental services and specialized expertise; and entering into similar arrangements with academic institutions, provided CIA sponsorship is known to the appropriate senior officials of the academic institutions and to senior project officials.

(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political, political-military, sociological, economic, scientific, technical and associated biographic information.

(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of his responsibilities and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign relations within the United States Government.

(3) Disseminate within the United States Government, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic missions abroad.

(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that United States intelligence activities and programs are useful for and consistent with United States foreign policy.

(5) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad and provide guidance for their collection effort.

(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community guidance for its collection of intelligence based on the needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.

(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the activities of all elements of their missions.

(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and monetary information.

(2) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

(3) Produce that intelligence required for the execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury.

(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.

(5) Disseminate within the United States Government, as appropriate, foreign intelligence information acquired.

(e) Department of Defense.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) Collect foreign military intelligence information as well as military-related foreign intelligence information, including scientific, technical, political and economic information as required for the execution of his responsibilities.

(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate, intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities and intentions and scientific, technical and economic developments pertinent to his responsibilities.

(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary to fulfill national intelligence requirements as determined by the CFI.

(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National Security Agency, and national, defense and military intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.

(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence activities and communications security.

(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government, except as otherwise approved by the CFI.

(2) In carrying out these assigned responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:

(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions, authorities and responsibilities are currently publicly assigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21) to:

(A) Produce or provide military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies.

(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements and manage the Defense Attache system.

(C) Establish substantive intelligence priority goals and objectives for the Department of Defense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence matters to all major Defense intelligence activities.

(D) Review and maintain cognizance over all plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic intelligence functions of the Department of Defense.

(E) Provide intelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions, authorities and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for the signals intelligence activities of the United States Government, except for certain operations which are normally exercised through appropriate elements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.

(B) Exercise control over signals intelligence collection and processing activities of the Government, delegating to an appropriate agent specified resources for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders.

(C) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence to all authorized elements of the Government, including the Armed Services, as requested.

(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense as the central communications security authority of the United States Government.

(F) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security.

(iii) Special offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Carrying out consolidated programs for reconnaissance.

(B) Assigning responsibility to the various departments and agencies of the Government, according to their capabilities, for the research, development, procurement, operations and control of designated means of collection.

(iv) Such other offices within the Department of Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense.

(f) Energy Research and Development Administration.

The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration shall:

(1) Produce intelligence required for the execution of his responsibilities and the mission of the Energy Research and Development Administration, hereinafter referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear and atomic energy.

(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide technical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence Community organizations and be responsive to the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community agencies and departments in formulating collection requirements where its special technical expertise can contribute to such collection requirements.

(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:

(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf of foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence operations within the United States, including electronic surveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.

(2) Conduct within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.



(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful means within the United States and its territories when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President to make such requests.

(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information which it acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

(5) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Sec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities.

Information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of other governments is essential to informed decision-making in the field of national defense and foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire such information should be responsive to the legitimate needs of our Government and must be conducted in a manner which preserves and respects our established concepts of privacy and our civil liberties.

Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability of government-wide direction which will ensure a proper balancing of these interests. This section of this Order does not authorize any activity not previously authorized

and does not provide exemption from any restrictions otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this section apply to activities both inside and outside the United States. References to law are to applicable laws of the United States.

(a) Definitions. As used in this section of this Order, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below:

(1) "Collection" means any one or more of the gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of non-publicly available information without the informed express consent of the subject of the information.

(2) "Counterintelligence" means information concerning the protection of foreign intelligence or of national security information and its collection from detection or disclosure.

(3) "Electronic surveillance" means acquisition of a non-public communication by electronic means, without the consent of a person who is a party to, or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly present at, the communication.

(4) "Employee" means a person employed by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United States foreign intelligence agency.

(5) "Foreign intelligence" means information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of any foreign power, or of any non-United States person, whether within or outside the United States, or concerning areas outside the United States.

(6) "Foreign intelligence agency" means the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes any other department or agency of the United States Government or component thereof while it is engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence, but shall not include any such department, agency or component thereof to the extent that it is engaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforcement functions; nor shall it include in any case the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(7) "National security information" has the meaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.

(8) "Physical surveillance" means continuing visual observation by any means; or acquisition of a non-public communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means which does not involve electronic surveillance.

(9) "United States person" means United States citizens, aliens admitted to the United States for permanent residence and corporations or other organizations incorporated or organized in the United States.

(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities:

(1) Physical surveillance directed against a United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against any of the following:

(i) A present or former employee of such agency, *OK*  
its present or former contractors or their present or former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; or

(ii) a United States person, who is in contact with either such a present or former contractor or employee or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify such United States person; or

(iii) a United States person outside the United States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf

of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening the national security.

(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept a communication which is made from, or is intended by the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United States, except for the purpose of testing equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with law.

*Per. Section 11*  
(3) Unconsented physical searches within the United States; or unconsented physical searches directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful searches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes of mail in United States postal channels except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax information except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation within the United States in any organization for the purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities

or members; except such infiltration or participation with respect to an organization composed primarily of non-United States persons which is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

(7) Collection of information, however acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United States persons except: *purely as factious*

(i) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(ii) Information concerning present or former employees, present or former contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with the foregoing or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry.

(iii) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of such persons.

(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with Section 5(b)(2); or foreign intelligence acquired from cooperating sources in the United States.

(v) Information about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities.

(vi) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided, that such information is retained only by the foreign intelligence agency threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.

(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this section of this Order shall prohibit:

(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered information indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law.

(2) Storage of information required by law to be retained.

(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence agencies of information of the subject matter types listed in Section 5(b)(7).

(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research.

(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.

(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall, except as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or to State or local police organizations of the United States or (ii) participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States.

(2) These prohibitions shall not, however, preclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency. 016



*Arch,*

(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a foreign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within the Federal Government shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to such employee's parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except as may be directed by the latter. The head of the host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the detailee's association with the parent agency.

(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.

(h) Implementation.

(1) This section of this Order shall be effective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency affected by this section of this Order shall promptly issue internal directives to implement this section with respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety days of the effective date of this section of this Order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Sec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.

(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Oversight Board.

(1) The Oversight Board shall have three members who shall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside the Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience. The members of the Oversight Board may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board shall have any personal contractual relationship with any agency or department of the Intelligence Community.

(2) One member of the Oversight Board shall be designated by the President as its Chairman.

(3) The Oversight Board shall:

(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(ii) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(iii) Review periodically with each member of the Intelligence Community their internal guidelines to ensure their adequacy.

(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.

(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney General and to the President any activities that raise serious questions about legality.

(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.

(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within the Intelligence Community shall:

(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports of any activities that come to their attention that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Oversight Board on its findings concerning questionable activities, if any.

(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information requested about activities within their respective departments or agencies.

(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion on which they were directed not to report any activity to the Oversight Board by their agency or department heads.

(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or departments shall:

(1) Report periodically to the Oversight Board on any activities of their organizations that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Oversight Board.

(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agency have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by paragraph (4) of this section.

(d) The Attorney General shall:

(1) Receive and consider reports from the Oversight Board.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the President with respect to activities of the Intelligence Community, if any, which raise questions of legality.

(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support. No person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board shall have any contractual or employment relationship with any department or agency in the Intelligence Community.

(f) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established by Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969, remains in effect.

Sec. 7. Secrecy Protection.

(a) In order to improve the protection of sources and methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive branch and its contractors given access to information containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.

(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence, the names of any persons found to have made unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action.

(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial order to prevent such disclosure.

(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide protection for other significant areas of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope

of agreements secured from those persons who, as an aspect of their relationship with the United States Government, have access to classified intelligence material.

Sec. 8. Enabling Data.

(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for detailed implementation of this Order by issuing appropriate directives.

(b) All existing National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence directives shall be amended to be consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.

(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential Memorandum of November 5, 1971, on the "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."

(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives to their organizations consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.

(e) This Order will be implemented within current manning authorizations of the Intelligence Community. To this end, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of personnel positions. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will also assist in the allocation of appropriate facilities.

GERALD R. FORD

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL 12:00 Noon(EST)

February 18, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET

The President's Actions Concerning  
the Foreign Intelligence Community

SUMMARY

The President has today taken the following comprehensive actions to strengthen the United States foreign intelligence departments and agencies: (1) issued an Omnibus Executive Order establishing policy guidelines and restrictions for the intelligence agencies and a new command structure and oversight mechanism for the intelligence community; (2) proposed new legislation to protect the secrecy of particularly sensitive intelligence information, announced that he will meet with Congressional leaders to develop legislation concerning electronic surveillance and to prevent unauthorized opening of mail, and he endorsed legislation to prohibit assassinations of foreign leaders; and, (3) proposed a framework in which constructive Congressional oversight can be established without disclosing intelligence secrets.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS

The President's actions are designed to insure that:

- (1) The United States has a strong and effective capability to gather and evaluate foreign intelligence and conduct necessary covert operations; and
- (2) These activities are conducted in a Constitutional and lawful manner and never aimed at our own citizens.

The President's actions will strengthen our foreign intelligence capability and establish an effective process to prevent abuses by:

- (A) Setting forth in Executive Order, policy guidance for the foreign intelligence agencies which define what functions they are supposed to carry out and which clearly states what they are not permitted to do.
- (B) Creating a streamlined command structure for intelligence community leadership which makes specifically designated individuals accountable.
- (C) Requiring the NSC to conduct semi-annual reviews of the adequacy of the foreign intelligence product and establishing the Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor compliance with the restrictions which have been placed on the intelligence community's activities.

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OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER(1) Control and Direction of Intelligence Organizations(A) Overall Policy Development

1. The National Security Council (NSC) will continue to exercise overall policy control over the foreign intelligence community.
2. Statutory members are:
  - The President
  - Vice President
  - Secretary of State
  - Secretary of Defense
3. The NSC will conduct a semi-annual policy review of foreign intelligence activities focused on, but not limited to, the following:
  - . Needs of government foreign policy-makers and the responsiveness of foreign intelligence to these needs, including the quality, scope and timeliness of the intelligence product;
  - . The effective and efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information; and
  - . The continued appropriateness of ongoing covert operations and sensitive intelligence collection missions.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will have staff responsibility for the semi-annual policy reviews. Heads of the departments and agencies which 'use' foreign intelligence will be consulted.

(B) Management and Resource Control

1. Responsibility for management and resource control of the foreign intelligence community is vested by Executive Order in the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), which reports directly to the NSC.
2. Membership of the CFI is:
  - The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),  
Chairman
  - Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
  - Deputy Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

(NOTE: Staff support shall be provided by the intelligence community staff.)
3. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall:
  - . Control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (defined as excluding tactical intelligence).

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- . Establish management policies for the Foreign Intelligence Program.
  - . Carry out policy decisions of the NSC with particular emphasis on collection and production of national intelligence.
4. Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the NSC upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the NSC.

(C) Production of National Intelligence

1. Responsibility for the production of substantive national (i.e., not tactical or departmental) intelligence is vested in the Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI is the President's primary advisor on foreign intelligence.
2. To assist in developing national intelligence requirements and priorities, and in developing finished national intelligence, the DCI shall establish such boards and committees (similar to the former USIB) of the intelligence community as will enable him most effectively to utilize the talent of the community to produce the best possible intelligence product.

(D) Covert Action and Other Special Operations

1. Responsibility to review and advise the President on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign intelligence collection missions is assigned by Executive Order to the Operations Advisory Group (Operations Group).
2. New membership is:
  - Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman
  - Secretary of State
  - Secretary of Defense
  - Director of Central Intelligence
  - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Observers are:

Attorney General  
Director of OMB

3. The Special Intelligence Operations Group shall:
  - . Consider and make recommendations to the President on all proposals for covert action and certain sensitive intelligence collection missions.
  - . Submit to the NSC a periodic review of ongoing covert operations and sensitive intelligence collection missions.
  - . Meet formally to carry out its responsibility to make recommendations to the President.

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(E) The following existing committees or organizations are abolished:

- (1) United States Intelligence Board
- (2) Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
- (3) National Security Council Intelligence Committee
- (4) Executive Committee for resource control of certain intelligence collection activity
- (5) 40 Committee

(2) Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community

- (A) The Senior Official of each organization of the intelligence community shall insure his organization operates in accordance with the Executive Order. He shall establish a system of independent inspection within the organization and provide information to the NSC, CFI and Intelligence Oversight Board. Other responsibilities as designated in Section IV of the Order.
- (B) CIA is responsible, among other duties as defined in Section IV of the Order, for:
  - . Production of national intelligence
  - . Maintaining and improving a national intelligence analytic base
  - . Collection by other than normal, overt means
  - . Foreign counterintelligence activities
  - . Undertaking activities defined in the Executive Order necessary to implement the above
- (C) The Department of State is primarily responsible for overt collection of foreign, non-military information. Its Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall also produce departmental intelligence and contribute to national intelligence production.
- (D) The Department of Treasury is responsible for overt collection of foreign, economic information.
- (E) The Department of Defense is responsible for:
  - . Overt collection outside the United States of foreign military and military-related information.
  - . Producing that intelligence required to fulfill the responsibilities of DOD.
  - . Managing the Defense Attache system.
  - . Providing intelligence staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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The National Security Agency is responsible for:

- . Full control over signals intelligence collection activities.
- . Production and dissemination of signals intelligence.
- . Providing communications security services to the U.S. Government.
- . Research and development related to signals intelligence.

(F) The Energy Research and Development Administration is responsible for producing intelligence relating to atomic and nuclear matters.

(G) The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for:

- . Making available to foreign intelligence agencies foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence which it collects.
- . Conducting foreign counterintelligence activities within the United States.

(3) Restrictions on Intelligence Activities

The Executive Order prohibits or severely restricts the following activities by United States foreign intelligence agencies:

- . Collection and analysis of information on the domestic activities of United States citizens, corporations and organizations and permanent resident aliens (referred to as U.S. persons).
- . Physical or electronic surveillance or physical searches of United States persons.
- . Opening of United States mail in violation of law.
- . Illegally obtaining federal tax returns or information.
- . Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose of influencing or reporting on them.
- . Experimentation with drugs on humans without the subject's informed consent. X
- . Sharing among agencies information on the domestic activities of United States persons except in compliance with stringent safeguards.
- . Assignment of personnel to other agencies.
- . Providing assistance to law enforcement agencies in violation of law.
- . Testing of electronic surveillance equipment within the United States.

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Limited exceptions are permitted to allow the agencies to meet the legitimate foreign intelligence needs of the Nation. These narrow exceptions are expressed in detail in the Order. They are designed to permit the following activities under carefully defined circumstances:

- . Collection of information on the domestic activities of U.S. persons in order to: conduct security checks on intelligence agency employees, contractors, people who are given access to classified information and persons who may assist the agency in the future. Overt collection of certain foreign intelligence information from other government agencies.
- . Counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.

(4) Oversight of Intelligence Activities

1. Responsibility to assist the President, the NSC and the Attorney General in overseeing the intelligence community is assigned by Executive Order to the Intelligence Oversight Board (Oversight Board).
2. New membership consists of three members from the private sector designated by the President. One of these will be designated by the President to be Chairman. They will also be made members of the PFIAB.
3. The Board shall:
  - . Receive and consider reports by Inspectors General and General Counsels of the intelligence community concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
  - . Review periodically the practices and procedures of the intelligence community Inspectors General and General Counsels designed to assist the Oversight Board.
  - . Report periodically and in a timely manner, as appropriate, to the Attorney General and the President on any activities that raise serious questions about legality. It shall report to the President on activities that raise questions of propriety of intelligence community activities.
  - . Receive staff support from persons not connected with the intelligence community.

(5) Secrecy Protection

All persons given access to information containing intelligence sources and methods shall be required to sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.

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A BILL

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of  
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, that  
3 Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,  
4 (50 U.S.C.A. 403) is further amended by adding the following  
5 new subsection (g):

6 (g) In the interests of the security of the foreign  
7 intelligence activities of the United States, and in order further  
8 to implement the proviso of section 102(d)(3) of the Act that the  
9 Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for  
10 protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized  
11 disclosure--

12 (1) Whoever, being or having been in duly  
13 authorized possession or control of information relating  
14 to intelligence sources and methods, or whoever, being  
15 or having been an officer or employee of the United States,  
16 or member of the Armed Services of the United States,  
17 or a contractor of the United States Government, or an  
18 employee of a contractor of the United States Government,  
19 and in the course of such relationship becomes possessed

1 of such information imparts or communicates it by any  
2 means to a person not authorized to receive it or to the  
3 general public shall be fined not more than \$5,000 or  
4 imprisoned not more than five years, or both;

5 (2) For the purposes of this subsection, the  
6 term "information relating to intelligence sources and  
7 methods" means any information, regardless of its origin, that  
8 is classified pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive  
9 order, or a regulation or a rule issued pursuant thereto as  
10 information requiring a specific degree of protection against  
11 unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security and  
12 which, in the interest of the foreign intelligence activities  
13 of the United States, has been specifically designated by  
14 a department or agency of the United States Government  
15 which is authorized by law or by the President to engage  
16 in foreign intelligence activities for the United States as  
17 information concerning--

18 (A) methods of collecting foreign intelligence;

19 (B) sources of foreign intelligence, whether  
20 human, technical, or other; or

21 (C) methods and techniques of analysis

1           and evaluation of foreign intelligence.

2           (3) A person who is not authorized to receive  
3           information relating to intelligence sources and methods is  
4           not subject to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an  
5           offense under this subsection, or as an accomplice, within  
6           the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of Title 18, United States  
7           Code, in the commission of an offense under this  
8           subsection, unless he became possessed of such information  
9           in the course of a relationship with the United States Govern-  
10          ment as described in paragraph (1): Provided, however, That  
11          the bar created by this paragraph does not preclude the  
12          indictment or conviction for conspiracy of any person who is  
13          subject to prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

14          (4) It is a bar to prosecution under this subsection that:

15                (A) at the time of the offense there did not  
16                exist a review procedure within the Government  
17                agency described in paragraph (2) of this subsection  
18                through which the defendant could obtain review  
19                of the continuing necessity for the classification  
20                and designation;

21                (B) prior to the return of the indictment or the

1 filing of the information, the Attorney General and the  
2 Director of Central Intelligence did not jointly certify  
3 to the court that the information was lawfully classified  
4 and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)  
5 at the time of the offense;

6 (C) the information has been placed in the public  
7 domain by the United States Government; or

8 (D) the information was not lawfully classified  
9 and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)  
10 at the time of the offense.

11 (5) It is a defense to a prosecution under this  
12 subsection that the information was communicated only to a  
13 regularly constituted subcommittee, committee or joint  
14 committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful demand.

15 (6) Any hearing by the court for the purpose of  
16 making a determination whether the information was lawfully  
17 classified and lawfully designated, shall be in camera;

18 (A) at the close of any in camera review, the  
19 court shall enter into the record an order pursuant  
20 to its findings and determinations;

21 (B) any determination by the court under this



1 paragraph shall be a question of law.

2 (7) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of  
3 Central Intelligence any person is about to engage in any  
4 acts or practices which will constitute a violation of this  
5 subsection, the Attorney General, on behalf of the United  
6 States, may make application to the appropriate court for an  
7 order enjoining such acts or practices, and upon a showing  
8 that such person is about to engage in any such acts or  
9 practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining  
10 order, or other order may be granted. In the case of an  
11 application for an order under this paragraph;

12 (A) the court shall not hold an in camera hearing  
13 for the purpose of making a determination as to the  
14 lawfulness of the classification and designation of the  
15 information unless it has determined after giving due  
16 consideration to all attending evidence that such  
17 evidence does not indicate that the matter has been  
18 lawfully classified and designated;

19 (B) the court shall not invalidate the classification  
20 or designation unless it finds that the judgment of the  
21 department or agency, pursuant to paragraph (2),

- 1 as to the lawfulness of the classification and
- 2 designation was arbitrary, capricious and without
- 3 a reasonable basis in fact.

The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The new subsection draws upon existing concepts of law found within 18 U.S.C. 793 (relating to communication intelligence) and 42 U.S.C. 2204 et seq. (relating to atomic energy Restricted Data).

Paragraph (1) of the new subsection identifies the special and limited class of individuals having privity of access to the sensitive information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable communication of such information to an unauthorized recipient.

Paragraph (2) of the new subsection defines the special category of information relating to intelligence sources and methods which is subject to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the Director and heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the United States, to provide for the appropriate designation of such information.

Paragraph (3) of the new subsection assures that only the special and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection. This is in keeping with the intent that the new provision penalizes as

tion is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship involving trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the violation of any other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this paragraph.

Paragraph (4) of the new subsection provides that no prosecution may be instituted unless the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated for limited dissemination; the information was not placed in the public domain by the Government; an agency review procedure existed whereby the defendant could have secured a review of the information in question for a determination on public releasability; and the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2) at the time of the offense.

Paragraph (5) of the new subsection provides a defense to prosecution if the information was only provided to a regularly constituted committee, joint committee or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful demand.

Paragraph (6) of the new subsection provides that any hearing by the court to determine whether the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated shall be in camera and such determination shall be a question of law.

Paragraph (7) of the new subsection permits the Attorney General to petition a court to enjoin injunction any act which the Director believes will violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is intended to provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U. S. foreign intelligence effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action alone, being necessarily ex post facto, may be inadequate in achieving the underlying objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources, methods and techniques from unauthorized disclosure. This paragraph also provides that in any hearing for such an order the court shall not hold an in camera hearing to determine the lawfulness of the classification and designation of the information unless it has first considered all attending evidence and determined that the evidence does not indicate that the matter has been lawfully classified and lawfully designated. The paragraph further provides that the court may invalidate a classification or designation if it finds the judgment of the department or agency head was arbitrary, capricious and without a reasonable basis in fact.

## SECTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The new subsection draws upon existing concepts of law found within 18 U.S.C. 798 (relating to communication intelligence) and 42 U.S.C. 2204 et seq. (relating to atomic energy Restricted Data).

Paragraph (1) of the new subsection identifies the special and limited class of individuals having privity of access to the sensitive information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable communication of such information to an unauthorized recipient.

Paragraph (2) of the new subsection defines the special category of information relating to intelligence sources and methods which is subject to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the Director and heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the United States, to provide for the appropriate designation of such information.

Paragraph (3) of the new subsection assures that only the special and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection. This is in keeping with the intent that the new provision penalizes as

unlawful only the conduct of those whose access to the designated information is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship involving trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the violation of any other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this paragraph.

Paragraph (4) of the new subsection provides that no prosecution may be instituted unless the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated for limited dissemination; the information was not placed in the public domain by the Government; an agency review procedure existed whereby the defendant could have secured a review of the information in question for a determination on public releasability; and the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2) at the time of the offense.

Paragraph (5) of the new subsection provides a defense to prosecution if the information was only provided to a regularly constituted committee, joint committee or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful demand.

Paragraph (6) of the new subsection provides that any hearing by the court to determine whether the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated shall be in camera and such determination shall be a question of law.

Paragraph (7) of the new subsection permits the Attorney General to petition a court to enjoin injunction any act which the Director believes will violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is intended to provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U. S. foreign intelligence effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action alone, being necessarily ex post facto, may be inadequate in achieving the underlying objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources, methods and techniques from unauthorized disclosure. This paragraph also provides that in any hearing for such an order the court shall not hold an in camera hearing to determine the lawfulness of the classification and designation of the information unless it has first considered all attending evidence and determined that the evidence does not indicate that the matter has been lawfully classified and lawfully designated. The paragraph further provides that the court may invalidate a classification or designation if it finds the judgment of the department or agency head was arbitrary, capricious and without a reasonable basis in fact.



EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL 12:00 NOON (EST)

FEBRUARY 18, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions of law, I have today issued an Executive Order pertaining to the organization and control of the United States foreign intelligence community. This order establishes clear lines of accountability for the Nation's foreign intelligence agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines to control the activities of these agencies and specifies as well those activities in which they shall not engage.

In carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities to manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the Nation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best possible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions and activities of governments and other entities and individuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence agencies of the United States play a vital role in collecting and analyzing information related to the national defense and foreign policy.

It is equally as important that the methods these agencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate needs of the government conform to the standards set out in the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens.

The Executive Order I have issued today will insure a proper balancing of these interests. It establishes government-wide direction for the foreign intelligence agencies and places responsibility and accountability on individuals, not institutions.

I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies while at the same time permitting them to get on with their vital work of gathering and assessing information. It is also my hope that these steps will help to restore public confidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to appreciate the valuable contribution they make to our national security.

Beyond the steps I have taken in the Executive Order, I also believe there is a clear need for some specific legislative actions. I am today submitting to the Congress of the United States proposals which will go far toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence secrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence collection in the United States.

My first proposal deals with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged, under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, with protecting intelligence sources and methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no authorities commensurate with this responsibility.

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Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose criminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized access to intelligence secrets and who willfully and wrongfully reveal this information. This legislation is not an "Official Secrets Act", since it would affect only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislation could not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties. It would in no way prevent people from reporting questionable activities to appropriate authorities in the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government.

It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and dangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence secrets be stopped. The American people have long accepted the principles of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings -- such as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes absolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our intelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our democratic society, but the American people have never believed that it was necessary to reveal the secret war plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think they wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed either.

I urge the adoption of this legislation with all possible speed.

Second, I support proposals that would clarify and set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular, I will support legislation making it a crime to assassinate or attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official in peacetime. Since it defines a crime, legislation is necessary.

Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with a critical problem involving personal privacy -- electronic surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the Justice Department and other Executive agencies, we will seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.

I will also seek Congressional support for sound legislation to expand judicial supervision of mail openings. The law now permits the opening of United States mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of criminal investigations. We need authority to open mail under the limitations and safeguards that now apply in order to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence information.

This would require a showing that there is probable cause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or terrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations, those seeking authority to examine mail for foreign intelligence purposes will have to convince a federal judge of the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon their authorization to examine the mail provided in the order of the court.

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Fourth, I would like to share my views regarding appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intelligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the Congress to organize itself to deal with these matters. Certain principles, however, should be recognized by both the Executive and Legislative Branches if this oversight is to be effective. I believe good Congressional oversight is essential so that the Congress and the American people whom you represent can be assured that the foreign intelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of their activities.

Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The more committees and subcommittees dealing with highly sensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I recommend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence Oversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional oversight in one committee will facilitate the efforts of the Administration to keep the Congress fully informed of foreign intelligence activities.

It is essential that both the House and the Senate establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be established a clear process to safeguard these secrets and effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.

Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an injunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no individual member, nor committee, nor single House of Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral publication of classified information over the objection of the President, by one committee or one House of Congress, not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but also effectively overrules the actions of the other House of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses.

Finally, successful and effective Congressional oversight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual trust between the Congress and Executive. Each branch must recognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the other if anything is to be achieved.

In this context, a Congressional requirement to keep the Oversight Committee "fully" informed is more desirable and workable as a practical matter than formal requirements for notification of specific activities to a large number of committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate committee briefings, should be modified as recommended by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be limited to the new Oversight Committee.

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... and the Executive Branch recognize  
... to this Nation of a strong intelligence  
5. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I  
outlined above to insure that America not only has  
the best foreign intelligence service in the world, but  
the most unique -- one which operates in a manner fully  
consistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.

GERALD R. FORD

WHITE HOUSE,

February 18, 1976.

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Both the Congress and the Executive Branch recognize the importance to this Nation of a strong intelligence service. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I have outlined above to insure that America not only has the best foreign intelligence service in the world, but also the most unique --- one which operates in a manner fully consistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.

GERALD R. FORD

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 18, 1976.

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